TBILISI, GEORGIA — Standing side by side with Georgia’s prime minister, Hungary’s Viktor Orban was among the first to congratulate the ruling Georgian Dream party on its recent electoral victory.
This endorsement came as much of the Western world raised questions about the legitimacy of the election and tens of thousands of Georgians were in the streets to protest it. Orban’s swift acknowledgment underscored his bond with Georgia’s government.
“I congratulate the prime minister on his election victory,” Orban declared, adding, “I see that nobody dares to question that this election was a free and democratic choice.”
For many observers, this alliance was hardly surprising. Both leaders have shown authoritarian tendencies in their governance styles, said Irakli Porchkhidze, senior fellow at the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies.
“They reinforce each other’s positions,” he told VOA.
Orban’s enthusiastic embrace of the Georgian Dream victory stands in contrast to the stance of the European Union, which expressed concerns over the election’s fairness. The EU noted that Orban was not speaking on its behalf.
Analysts argue that the alliance between Orban and Georgia’s ruling party is not based on any ideological commitment but rather on mutual convenience.
Aka Zarqua, editor-in-chief of Realpolitik, described it to VOA as “a marriage of convenience between two autocrats.”
Hungary has reportedly lobbied against EU sanctions on Georgia’s leadership and pushed Brussels to grant Tbilisi EU candidate status ahead of the elections. Notably, in 2012, Orban stood next to then-President Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, who is now Georgian Dream’s chief adversary.
“As a Hungarian friend, believe me — don’t go back. … I would like to ask you to keep your country on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration,” Orban said on October 27, 2012, standing next to Saakashvili. That year, Saakashvili lost the elections, and Georgian Dream came to power.
“That was a different Orban,” Dalibor Rohac, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told VOA in a phone call.
Twelve years later, when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, EU and NATO members criticized Orban for his determination to remain friendly with Russia, something Georgia’s ruling party has also done.
Hungary, under Orban’s leadership, has become a template for Georgia’s leaders as they seek to consolidate power while maintaining the appearance of democracy, Zarqua said.
“One of them is leading, offering lessons to [former Prime Minister Bidzina] Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream party on how to control civil society and establish what political scientists call competitive authoritarianism,” Zarqua said.
Georgian Dream’s ties to Russia have been widely discussed, with Rohac referring to the party as “Russia’s fifth column” in Georgia, underscoring the growing perception that Georgian leadership is aligning itself with Moscow.
“[Georgian Dream] is a political force that has dragged Georgia into Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese spheres of influence. And Viktor Orban, since his transformation, since 2010, has been doing the same for Hungary,” Rohac said.
Pro-Russian narratives have increasingly shaped Georgian politics, much like Hungary under Orban. Both governments have cast themselves as challengers to Western liberalism, amplifying Kremlin talking points to rally domestic support. They’ve also enacted Russian-inspired foreign agent laws to target foreign-funded organizations, a tactic critics see as a way to silence opposition.
“They have copied each other in how they manage elections,” Porchkhidze said. “They are hostile toward the dissent. Let it be the opposition, media or civil society organizations,” he said.
However, the differences are significant. Hungary is already a member of NATO and the European Union, providing it with a certain degree of protection and a security umbrella.
“It’s much more dangerous for Georgian society to follow these tendencies than it is for Hungarian society,” Zarqua cautioned.
Hungary and Georgia have experienced Russian aggression — Hungary during the Soviet crackdown of 1956 and Georgia in the 1990s and again in 2008, with Russian forces still occupying 20% of Georgia’s territory. Both countries have since invoked these fears, warning of potential Russian threats if they lose power.
“They are exploiting the trauma of Russia’s aggression,” Zarqua said, calling it “just political technology.”
Orban’s Fidesz party and the Georgian Dream party have also tapped into anti-Western narratives that have gained traction across Europe. The rhetoric often centers on portraying the West as decadent and in decline, a narrative that finds strong echoes in Russian propaganda.
“There’s a common thread running through the messaging of Russian propaganda, Georgian Dream and Orban — that the West is decadent, and these countries should place their bets elsewhere rather than in the West,” Rohac said.
This anti-Western sentiment is often couched in the language of “traditional values” and opposition to LGBTQ rights, a tactic aimed at appealing to domestic audiences, said the AEI’s Rohac.
“For Orban, the most important consideration is staying in power,” Rohac said. “Sometimes that means turning against LGBTQ rights. Georgian Dream is doing the same. I don’t think this really reflects a deep commitment to cultural conservatism.”
The West’s lack of a coherent strategy for the post-Soviet space has also contributed to the rise of leaders like Orban and their allies, Zarqua said.
“The West is not as attractive as it was during the unipolar moment of the 1990s and 2000s,” he said.
…